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If we consider the development of law in China from the Western Zhou??to the 
Qing?, we can readily distinguish between an earlier or immature stage and a later or 
mature stage.  Where the line is drawn may be a matter of difficulty.  Yet some 
statements may be uncontroversial.  For example, few would disagree that the codes 
of the sixth century B.C. belong to the former, while the Tang code (Tang lü shu-yi ?
???) belongs to the latter.  From the later Zhou period ?(Warring States) the use 
of law as the principal instrument for the government of the state is continually being 
developed.  Experiments both in the arrangement of the rules of law and in the 
formulation of individual rules were made. Such experiments continued throughout 
the Qin ? , Han ? , and post-Han?periods.  Important improvements in the 
composition of the law codes were achieved in both the southern and northern 
dynasties, the culmination of the process being the Tang code which was itself the 
model for the codes of future dynasties.  We are concerned here mainly with the law 
of the Qin?and Han?periods, which in the context of the evolution of law in China 
we classify as belonging to the early or immature stage. 
The theoretical assumption underlying this study is that early law in general 
takes a situational approach to the problem of liability. This means that the 
perspective of the rules which impose liability for harm is that of the whole ‘situation’ 
from which the harm results.  ‘Situation’ in this context points mainly to the physical 
circumstances of the act and not the mental state of the perpetrator.  For example, the 
rules might say “if ‘A’ strikes ‘B’ with a weapon and kills him, ‘A’ is to be put to 
death,” rather than “if ‘A’ intentionally kills ‘B’, ‘A’ is to be put to death.”  This does 
not mean that the formulation of the first rule ignores altogether the element of 
intention.  Even the simplest peoples are able to distinguish between the intentional 
and the non-intentional infliction of harm and differentiate accordingly the gravity of 
the punishment.1  The point is that reference to the perpetrator’s state of mind is 
implicit in, and inferred from, the external circumstances of the act.  From the fact 
that a weapon was used to kill, the inference will be drawn that the killing was 
‘intentional’ and so more serious than a killing which had occurred, for example, in 
the course of a violent game.  It is only in the later or mature stage of legal 
development (in China clearly demonstrated by the Tang code) that rules imposing 
liability come themselves to be formulated in terms of the perpetrator’s state of mind, 
with distinctions correspondingly drawn between intentional, careless, and accidental 
acts.2 
 
                                                
1 At one time it was commonly held that early law imposed liability on account of an act causing harm 
irrespective of the perpetrator’s state of mind: see, for example, F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland. The 
History of English Law Volume II, Second edition reissued with a new introduction and select 
bibliography by S.F.C. Milsom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 470-2. This 
approach has now been discredited: see, for example, D. Daube. Roman Law. Linguistic, Social and 
Philosophic Aspects. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969, pp. 161-6. 
2 For a more detailed discussion see G. MacCormack. “Standards of Liability in Early Law,” Juridical 
Review (1985), pp. 166-177. 
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The example of ‘situational liability’ addressed in this paper is encapsulated in 
the phrase zei sha ??.  In early Chinese law this phrase designates a certain kind of 
homicide, which has some affinities with the category of homicide later designated as 
gu sha ?? (intentional killing).  However, it will be argued that it is a mistake to 
translate zei? as a reference to any particular state of mind such as ‘premeditation’, 
‘intent’, or ‘malice’.  The word points explicitly not to state of mind on the part of the 
perpetrator but to the external circumstances of the act, in particular the use of 
violence.  This means not that the early Chinese were unaware of the difference 
between intentional and non-intentional acts but that, when determining liability, they 
focused upon the concrete manifestations of an act rather than the more intangible 
element of the perpetrator’s state of mind.  Deductions as to the state of mind (for 
example, whether there had been intention or not) would be drawn from the 
circumstances of the act. 
In the context of liability for harm in Chinese law of the Qin/Han?/?period, 
the legal rules imposing punishments were still formulated from the perspective of the 
whole situation rather than a specific state of mind.  This is well illustrated by the 
laws on homicide, which were framed with reference to the type or category of act 
from which death resulted.  The focus of the rules was upon the ‘situation’ in which 
the perpetrator found himself, not upon his state of mind.  This can be seen most 
obviously in the categories of dou sha ?? and xi sha ??, the former covering 
homicides that occurred in the course of a fight and the latter those that occurred in 
the course of sport or play.  But even the category of guo shi sha ??? (accidental 
homicide) was understood not abstractly as ‘homicides in which there had been no 
intention to cause harm on the part of the perpetrator’, but rather concretely in terms 
of a variety of specific situations.  This can be seen from the account in the Zhou li?
?of the ‘three grounds of leniency (san yu ??)’ with the explanations advanced by 
the Han commentators Zheng Zhong??and Zheng Xuan ??.3   Likewise, at this 
time, the category of mou sha ??expressed the fact that the killing had resulted from 
a situation in which two or more persons had plotted to kill another, rather than the 
existence of a premeditated intention to kill. 
With respect to zei sha ?? , the situation expressed can generally be 
denominated as one of unprovoked violence, as where one person sets upon or attacks 
and kills another.  The circumstances show that there was on the part of the 
perpetrator an intention to kill, but the word zei? itself points not so much to the 
existence of this intention as to the use of violence.  The most frequent (although not 
the only) kind of zei sha ??appears to have been that in which some weapon such as 
a sharp bladed instrument was used to bring about death.  The term zei sha ??was 
retained in the law after the Han?.  It still designated a category of homicide in Jin ?
law and was probably so used in the successive codes of the southern dynasties that 
largely copied the Jin ?code.  It is the Northern Wei??code that first replaced zei 
sha ??with the term gu sha??.  The latter term came to be adopted by Sui/Tang ?
/?law and from there passed into the Ming ?and Qing ?codes.  The change of name 
is significant because gu ?itself expresses the mental element of intention and not the 
                                                
3 Zhou li zhu shu ji bu zheng???????. Taipei, 1980, 36.12b; E. Biot, Le Tcheou-Li ou Rites des 
Tcheou. Tome II. Paris, 1851, reprinted Taipei: Ch’eng Wen, 1975, pp. 355-6. See, in particular, B.E. 
Wallacker, “The Chinese Offense of Homicide Through Horseplay”, Chinese Studies, 1 (1983), pp. 
264-267 (with further references). 
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physical element of violence.  In other words, the Northern Wei ??law by changing 
the name of zei sha ??to gu sha ??changed the focus of this category of homicide.  
It now lay in the perpetrator’s state of mind rather than in the circumstances of the act. 
In its formulation of the categories of homicide, the law appears to have been 
conservative. In other legal contexts we find explicit recognition of the importance of 
intention (gu?) as early as the Qin/Han ?/?.  One example, although neither gu? 
nor zei ?appears in the wording, is a version of the principle already stated at the 
beginning of Western Zhou ??, namely that intentional offenses should be punished 
more severely than inadvertent ones.4  In the Lun Heng ?? (first century A.D.) the 
principle is cited in the form: “In punishing intentional crimes there is none that is too 
small (xing gu wu xiao ????), and in pardoning (non-intentional) faults, there is 
none that is too great (you guo wu da ????).”5  The maxim is further explained as 
follows: “After scrutinising the heart (xin?) and mind (yi?) of the offender, the wise 
sovereign punishes intention (gu?) but pardons mistakes (wu?).  He increases the 
punishment for intentional assaults (gu zei??), but decreases it for (non-intentional) 
errors (guo wu??).”6  Two points strike one in reading this explanation.  The first is 
the explicit reference of gu (intention?) to the offender’s ‘heart and mind’, and the 
second is the juxtaposition of gu ?zei ?in which gu?expresses the mental and zei ?
the physical component of the offense. 
Other examples can be found in the technical legal usage of the Qin/Han?/? 
period.  There is evidence from the first century B.C. and the first century A.D. that 
both statutes and judgments used the term gu? in describing the offenses of giving 
false testimony or making a wrong judgment.  The Han lü??of the first century A.D. 
contained a clause specifying: “Where evidence is given deliberately not in 
accordance with the truth (gu bu shi???) concerning the value of property in cases 
where the offense is constituted by illicit goods (zang?) of a value of 500 units or 
more, and the statements, once completed, have not been changed after three days, the 
person making the false statement is to be reciprocally liable (fan zui??) in respect 
of the offense which is, in consequence of his evidence, punished too lightly (chu zui
??) or too severely (ru zui??)”7. 
 
                                                
4 See the K’ang kao ??: J. Legge, The Chinese Classics. Taiwan reprint, 3, p. 388, para 8; B. 
Karlgren, “The Book of Documents,” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 22 (1950), p. 
40 (8).  It is generally thought that the K’ang kao??is a genuine document preserved from the early 
years of Western Zhou  ( E.L. Shaughnessy, “Shang shu??,” in M. Loewe (ed). Early Chinese Texts: 
A Bibliographical Guide.  Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993, p. 
379).  However, some scholars have argued that the Kang gao??may have been written several 
centuries after its purported date: see, in particular, K. Vogelsang, “Inscriptions and Proclamations: On 
the Authenticity of the ‘gao’ Chapters in the Book of Documents,” Bulletin of the Museum for Far 
Eastern Antiquities, 74 (2002), pp. 138-209. 
5 The same thought is expressed in an inverted form in one of the books of the Shang shu believed to 
have been fabricated in the fourth century A.D. Ta Yü Mu???: Legge, Chinese Classics, 3, p. 59. 
6 Lun heng ji jie????. Taipei, 1975, 11.3, p. 239; A. Forke, Lun-Heng. Part II. Miscellaneous 
Essays of Wang Ch’ung, second edition. New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1962, pp. 46-7; Wallacker, 
Chinese Studies, 1 (1983), pp. 263-4 
7 Cited by Gao Heng??, “Investigation of Han Slips”, in Li Xueqin ??? (ed), Jianbo yanjiu???
? (Research on Bamboo and Silk Documents), Volume 2. Beijing: Publishing House of Law, 1996, pp. 
228-9. 
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As early as the Qin?, we find the term gu shi?? used as a shorthand 
expression for wrongful judgments made deliberately (gu?) or through error (shi?).8  
During the Han?, the technical terms gu bu zhi ???and gu zong??denominated 
respectively the offenses of “deliberately sentencing an offender to the wrong 
punishment” or “deliberately letting an offender go.”9  We have some references in 
the Han shu??to officials sentenced for the offense of deliberately making a wrong 
judgment (gu bu zhi???)10 or of deliberately acquitting offenders who should have 
been punished (gu zong ??)11  Towards the end of the former Han?, the authorities, 
fearing that too many cases of gu zong were being prosecuted, secured an imperial 
edict providing that administrators of provinces were not to be considered as 
committing the offense of gu zong??.12 
During the Later Han ??we find the terms gu?and wu?used to designate 
respectively intentional or mistaken failures in administration.  The surviving 
examples concern mistakes made by officials responsible for the copying and 
transmission of edicts. In A.D. 80 an error was made in the copying of an edict, as a 
result of which a person given an imperial pardon was executed.  The jurist to whom 
the matter was referred said: “The laws and ordinances have both gu?and wu?. . . If 
there is wu?then the text of the laws treats the matter lightly.”13  This suggests that, 
towards the end of the first century A.D., the distinction between ‘intention (gu?)’ 
and ‘mistake (wu?)’ was at least in some administrative contexts coming to be 
formally expressed in the statutory rules. 
On the basis of the evidence summarised in the previous paragraphs, one may 
offer the following generalization.  Qin? and Han ? law recognized the importance 
of ‘intention’, denominated ku?, as a constituent element of administrative offenses, 
that is, offenses constituted by the manner in which officials performed their duties.  
The factor responsible for the explicit use of gu? in the formulation of the rules 
imposing punishments was the need to distinguish the case in which the official knew 
he was doing wrong from that in which he had committed an error through 
inadvertence. Hence, we have the contrast drawn in the rules between acts performed 
gu?and those performed wu?or shi?.  Although it is also imperative in the law of 
homicide for the rules to distinguish between ‘intentional’ and ‘inadvertent’ acts, the 
distinction was implicit in the categories known already at the beginning of the Han? 
and probably inherited from the earlier law.  Han ?legislators saw no need to 
reformulate those categories since the ‘situations’ which they described seemed an 
                                                
8 Shi ji??. Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1972, 2. 758.  A different interpretation is given by R.D.S. Yates, 
“State Control of Bureaucrats under the Qin: Techniques and Procedures,” Early China, 20 (1995), p. 
354. 
9 This definition is cited by the commentator Jin Zhuo ?? (fl. ca. A.D. 208).  It is possibly taken from 
the Han? legal commentary entitled Lü shuo?? (Exegesis of the Statutes): Han shu??. Beijing: 
Zhong-hua, 1962, 3. 662; A.F.P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955, p. 253.  
10 Han shu, 3. 667-8, 10. 3224-5; Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, 258 (5), (16). 
11 Dubs, H.H. The History of the Former Han Dynasty by Pan Ku II. The American Coucil of Learned 
Societies, 1944, reprinted 1954, p. 158; Han shu, 9. 2914;  Hulsewé, Remants of Han Law, 259 (1), (2); 
B. Watson, Courtier and Commoner in Ancient China. Selections from the History of the Former Han. 
New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 114-115. 
12 Han shu, 11. 3490, 3490 n10; Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 259 (3). 
13 Shen Jia-ben ???. Li dai xing fa kao????? (Investigation into the Penal Law of Successive 
Dynasties). Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1985, 3, p. 1472; Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 257; R.H. van 
Gulik, Tang-Yin-Pi-Shih????. Parallel Cases from under the Pear Tree. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1956, 
pp. 134-135. 
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adequate basis for the imposition of liability and determination of punishment.  Hence 
zei sha?? was still used to describe a category of homicide in which the ‘situation’ 
giving rise to the killing was that of unprovoked violence.  The rest of the paper will 
examine the usage of zei sha ??in pre-Han? sources as well as in the laws of the 
Han?, Qin?, and southern dynasties, and its replacement by gu sha?? in the 
northern dynasties. 
 
Pre-Han?Cases of Zei Sha?? 
Although we cannot be sure of the original meaning of the word zei?,14 it is worth 
noting Karlgren’s observation that one of the graphs making up the character is that 
for ‘dagger-axe’. 15   This already suggests the utility of the character for the 
description of killings which occur through violence, especially through the 
employment of bladed weapons. 
In the Zuo zhuan ??, zei ?itself is often used to express the act of killing in 
contexts which suggest the employment of violence against an unsuspecting victim. 
There are several accounts of the assassination of nobles or rulers in which zei ?
expresses the unlawful and violent act of killing.16  Three passages are particularly 
instructive. The first relates events in Lu ?for the year 656 B.C.  The ruler’s eldest 
son was advised by his stepmother to sacrifice to his deceased mother.  He sent the 
sacrificial food and wine to his father. The ruler’s new wife (stepmother) poisoned the 
offerings and then gave them to her husband.  He gave the flesh to a dog and ordered 
an attendant to drink the wine.  When both died, his wife declared: “This is your 
eldest son’s attempt to kill (zei?) you.”17  The use of zei ? is interesting because it 
expresses an act of killing that was not to take place through an overt act of violence. 
What zei ?emphasises in this context is the particular wickedness of an attempt by a 
son and subject to kill his father and ruler.  By contrast, the ruler’s response in putting 
his son’s tutor to death is termed sha?not zei?. 
The second passage records the reaction of the tyrannical Duke Ling ??of 
Jin ? (609 B.C.) to a minister who was in the habit of remonstrating with him.  The 
ruler sent an emissary to assassinate (zei?) the minister, but the assassin on seeing the 
minister refused to obey the order and committed suicide rather than kill (zei?) an 
upright man.18  Even though it was the ruler who ordered the killing, it was still wrong 
to kill a loyal minister who had committed no offense but merely offered criticism of 
improper acts.  The fact that the proposed killing was not a lawful execution but an 
act of tyranny and abuse of power is expressed by the word zei?. 
Finally, we have an account of a dispute over land (528 B.C.) between two 
Zhou ?princes who had sought refuge in Jin?.  One of the litigants bribed the judge 
with the offer of his daughter and secured a verdict in his favor.  The loser then killed 
                                                
14 Personal communication from Professor Ulrich Lau. 
15 Karlgren, B. Grammata Serica Recensa. Stockholm: Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 1972, p. 
240 (No. 907 a-b). 
16 Duke Chuang ??32 (662 BC): S. Couvreur, La Chronique de la Principauté de Lou. Paris: 
Cathasia, 1951, I, pp. 207, 208; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, pp. 120, 121. Duke Min ??2 (660 BC): 
Couvreur, Chronique, I, p. 216; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, pp. 126, 128. Duke Ting?? 2 (508 BC): 
Couvreur, Chronique, III, p. 491; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, p. 746. 
17 Duke His?? 4: Couvreur, Chronique, I, p. 246; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, pp. 140, 142. 
18 Duke Hsüan?? 2: Couvreur, Chronique, I, pp. 569-570; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, pp. 288, 290.  
See also Guo yu ??. Shanghai: Gu-ji, 1978, II, p. 399.  
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(sha?) both his adversary and the judge in the palace of the ruler.  The matter was 
referred to the minister Shu-xiang ??who held that all three persons involved had 
committed capital offenses.  He described the offense of the loser in the following 
terms: “to kill (sha?) people without fear or respect (bu ji??) is zei?.”  He then 
cites an old principle (attributed to the Xia ?dynasty) according to which persons 
who commit zei ? (or who are zei?) are to be put to death.19  The interest of the 
passage lies in Shu-xiang’s??explanation of the act of killing (sha?) as zei?.  Zei 
?here appears to be an offense constituted by killing another in total disregard of the 
law without any good reason.  It is the unlawful nature of the act rather than the 
means by which it is accomplished to which Shu-xiang ??draws attention.  
Significantly, he does not offer a definition of zei? in terms of the intention or state 
of mind of the perpetrator. 
Zei ?in the sense of ‘assassinate (a ruler)’ is also found in the Shi ji’s??  
account of a famous incident.  In 227 B.C., crown prince Dan ?of Yan ?sent Jing Ke 
??to kill the king of Qin?.  By a stratagem Jing Ke ??secured an audience with 
the king and then struck at him with a dagger.  After the attack had been foiled, the 
king later referred to Jing Ke’s ??mission as ‘to cause zei?’.20  Although zei? has 
been taken in the general sense of ‘villainy’ or ‘evil’21 its proper sense, as in the Zuo 
chuan, seems to be ‘to commit an act of assassination’.22  The particular act of zei ?
here consists of an unprovoked attack with a sharp bladed weapon. 
The passages considered above illustrate the use of zei? in a discussion of 
incidents by historians. The latter describe the act of killing as zei?, but do not cite 
the legal rules which impose liability for zei sha??. Historians used zei? with a 
primary sense of  ‘in total defiance of any legal restraint’ or ‘with outrageous 
disregard of one’s proper duty’. Although zei ?also normally expressed the fact that 
the killing occurred through an act of violence, the element of violence need not be 
present, as in the case of the alleged attempt by the prince to poison his father.  What 
is emphasised is the extremity of the degree to which the act of killing is wrong. 
Not until the Qin?laws of the third century B.C. do we have evidence of the 
use of zei ?as a technical legal term.  Although the Qin?statutes on homicide have 
not been preserved, it is clear from other evidence that they distinguished two 
categories of homicide, zei sha??and dou sha?? (killing in a fight), as well as two 
categories of wounding zei shang ??and dou shang??.23  Unfortunately, the extant 
                                                
19 Duke Chao?? 14: Couvreur, Chronique, III, pp. 248-249; Legge, Chinese Classics, 5, pp. 654, 656. 
20 Shi ji??, 1.235-6, 8.2533-2535; W.H. Nienhauser, Jr., The Grand Scribe’s Records. Volume I. The 
Basic Annals of Pre-Han China by Ssu-ma Ch’ien. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, p. 135; W.H. Nienhauser, Jr., The Grand Scribe’s Records. Volume VII. The Memoirs of Pre-
Han China by Ssu-ma Ch’ien. Bloomington and Indianapolis; Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 330-
332; B. Watson, Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty. Hong Kong and New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993, p. 42. 
21 Nienhauser and Watson ibid. 
22 So E. Chavannes. Les mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts’ien. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897, II, p. 124. 
23 See, for example, the Qin?laws labelled D83 and D99 by A.F.P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law. 
An annotated translation of the Ch’in legal and administrative rules of the 3rd century B.C. discovered 
in Yün Prefecture, Hu-pei Province, in 1975. Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1985, pp. 146, 154.  Texts can be found 
in Liu Hainian ???and Yang Yifan ??? (eds), Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji cheng ?? ??
?????? (Rare Ancient Codes of Chinese Law). Beijing, 1994, I, pp. 585-6, 594. Compare also 
K.C.D. McLeod and R.D.S. Yates, “Forms of Ch’in Law: An Annotated Translation of the Feng-shen 
Shih”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 41.1 (1981), p. 155 n157. 
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texts provide no definition of zei?.  The translators into English of the laws have 
offered two alternatives.  Hulsewé has suggested ‘murderously’, ‘by murderous 
intent’, ‘with malice aforethought’ or ‘intentionally’,24 while Yates and McLeod 
prefer ‘wantonly’ or ‘by wanton violence’.25  The interpretation of Yates and McLeod 
is to be preferred.  Among the Qin legal materials is a report on the discovery of a 
corpse headed zei si??,26 a phrase translated by Hulsewé as ‘death by murderous 
intent’27 and Yates and McLeod as ‘death by wanton violence’.28  The report draws 
the conclusion that the death (si?) was zei ?by pointing to the following facts: the 
male corpse had a wound on his neck made with a blade and on his back two wounds 
resembling those inflicted by an axe.  It is the element of violent attack with a 
weapon, where the wounds have been inflicted on the neck and back, that warrant the 
conclusion that the man had been set upon and killed zei? rather than that he had 
been killed in a fight (dou?).  No reference to intent is made in the report. 
Other texts give us some further clue as to the way in which zei? was 
understood in Qin?law.  One states that, where wounds have been inflicted by sharp 
pointed implements like a needle or awl, the punishment varies according to whether 
the situation has been one of dou?or zei?. 29  This shows that the use of a dangerous 
implement in inflicting a wound was not in itself enough to ensure the classification 
of the case as zei?.  The situation might have been one in which the wound had been 
inflicted in the course of a fight.  For the wound to have been inflicted zei?, it was 
necessary that there should have been an element of unprovoked attack in which the 
victim had no real chance of resistance.  One can see why the perpetrator’s state of 
mind would have been an insecure basis for the distinction between zei ?and dou?, 
since in a fight there would have been an intention to harm, not always easily 
distinguishable from an intention to kill. 
One text makes it plain that it is not necessary to use a sharp bladed weapon in 
order to be guilty of zei sha??or zei??shang.  A case is put in which one person 
zei? wounds another with a stick.  The text defines ‘stick’ as “a piece of wood that 
can be used to strike.”30  The idea here is that the stick is used as a weapon. 
Two texts make an explicit reference to an element of ‘intention’. One puts a 
case of slaves plotting (mou?) to kill their master and defines ‘plot’ as “wishing to 
zei sha??.” 31  Here the element of intention expressed by ‘wish (yu?)’ is referable 
to the definition of mou? not zei?.  The plot itself shows that the attack on the 
master will be unprovoked.  The other text puts a case in which a person while 
arresting another, who has committed an offense punishable by a fine, ‘on purpose 
(duan?)’ kills the latter. 32   This is not a case of zei sha??, since the person killed 
                                                
24 D35 n1, E20 = Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, pp. 132, 198.  
25 McLeod and Yates, “Forms of Ch’in Law”, p. 140 n92, though one cannot necessarily follow the 
authors (p. 154) in taking zei?as used “to classify degrees of culpability.” 
26Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji cheng, I, p. 662. 
27 E20, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 198. 
28 Yates,  “Forms of Ch’in Law,” 5.19, p. 154. 
29 D71, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 142; Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng, I, p. 378. 
30 D76, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 144; Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng,I, pp. 580-1. 
31 D60, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 140; Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng, I, p. 574. 
32 D104, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 15; Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng, I, p. 596. 
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was already in the position of an offender, but rather one of gross abuse of authority 
(later classified as shan sha??).  The killer had the authority to arrest and not the 
authority to kill unless the offender offered resistance.  The element of ‘purpose (duan
?)’ is emphasised in this context because of the necessity to distinguish the case in 
which an offender was killed while resisting arrest (legitimate) from that in which he 
had done nothing and yet was killed (illegitimate). 
There remains one text which shows that even as early as the third century B.C. 
the law was prepared to use zei? in a constructive or extended sense, that is, apply it 
to a situation to which it was not strictly applicable.  The case is put in which a thief-
catcher pursues and attempts to arrest an offender.  The latter beats and kills the 
former.  The legal question raised is, should the case be classified as dou sha??or 
zei sha???  Strictly it should be dou sha ??since the death occurred in the course 
of a fight between the offender and the thief-catcher.  But we are told that the 
‘precedents of the court (ting xing shi???)’33 treated the case as zei sha??.34  The 
reason, not stated, is that a proper maintenance of law and order required that 
offenders who fought with and killed the arresting person(s) should be deemed to 
have committed the most serious form of homicide, zei sha??.  We perhaps also 
have here the implication that the killing was ‘outrageous’, in the sense that the 
victims were persons (possibly officers of the law) engaged in carrying out a legal 
duty. 
The material from the Qin?laws is illuminating because it shows that the 
meaning of zei? was governed to some extent by the need to distinguish zei sha??
from dou sha?? (killing in a fight).  A fight may well have involved the use of 
weapons, even sharp bladed ones.  One could not distinguish zei sha?? from dou 
sha ??simply by pointing to the existence of a weapon.35  The essential distinction 
lay not in the presence or absence of a weapon, but in whether the killing occurred in 
the course of a fight or not, thus pointing to the significance of ‘provocation’. 
One has here a very clear reliance upon the ‘situation’ from which the killing 
results as the determinant of the legal category of homicide.  If the situation is that of 
a fight, the homicide will be treated as dou sha??.  If there has been no fight, the 
fact that a weapon has been used will normally point to a classification of the 
homicide as zei sha??. 
 
Zei Sha??in Han?Law 
The Han?inherited from the Qin?the basic structure of its law of homicide and 
wounding.  The code of 186 B.C.  (Er Nian Lü Ling????)36 contains in its section 
entitled zei lü ??a number of rules on zei sha??and zei shang??,37 where these 
terms are often used in contrast to dou sha??or dou shang??.  No definitions are 
                                                
33 On this expression, see Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, D30, nn 2, 3, p. 131. 
34 D53, Hulsewé, Remnants of Ch’in Law, p. 138; Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng, I, pp. 569-70. 
 
35 We do not know whether Qin ?law already had a rule corresponding to the Tang?, namely that 
killing in a fight with a sharp bladed implement was deemed to be intentional.  See further below at 
note 86. 
36 This code is written on bamboo slips excavated from a Han tomb in 1984. It was first published in 
Beijing in 2001: Zhang Jia Shan Han Mu Zhu Jian (Er Si Qi Hao Mu) ??????(?????) (Han 
Slips Excavated from Tomb Number 287 in Zhangjiashan). 
37 Slips 21-3, 25 (p. 137), 34, 38 (p. 139), 40 (p.140). 
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given, but the contrast between zei ?and dou ?suggests that the former referred to 
acts of violence that did not occur in the course of a fight, that is, where there had 
been no immediate provocation and the victim was not taken and overcome by 
surprise.  One clause deals with the zei sha??or zei shang ??of another’s domestic 
animal.38  Zei?must bear a similar sense in this context, that is, express the killing or 
wounding of an animal that had not attacked the offender.  Another clause speaks not 
of zei sha/shang??/?but of the zei ?burning of a city, official buildings, or 
government storehouses.39  We cannot explain zei? in the context of arson in quite 
the same way as in the context of killing or wounding.  The editors explain zei ?as 
‘intentional, deliberate (gu yi?? )’. One cannot altogether rule out such an 
explanation, which points to the perpetrator’s state of mind.  But it is more likely that 
zei ?points to the external circumstances of the act, in particular the element of attack 
or violence. 
We have four references to zei ?in later Han statutes.  The zei lü ??at the 
end of the first century B.C. contain a clause imposing a punishment of penal servitude 
for four years on persons who in a fight wounded another with a cutting weapon and 
providing that in cases of zei? the punishment is to be one degree more, that is, penal 
servitude for five years.40  Zei ?in this formulation has been translated as ‘murderous 
intent’41 or ‘premeditated murder’.42  However, as we shall see from the discussion of 
the case in which the clause is cited,43 it is better to construe zei ?as a reference to the 
external circumstances of violence (not being a fight) under which the wound was 
inflicted. 
The statutes on arrest (bu lü??) of the first century B.C. contain a clause 
which provided: “Where enemy soldiers have fled to a frontier beacon post to 
surrender, or had come from outside the frontier to surrender, but the guards zei sha?
?them, the offenders are to be cut in two at the waist and their wives and children are 
to provide labor as robber guards.”44  Zei sha??in this context cannot have the sense 
of ‘premeditated or intentional killing’, because any killing of an enemy soldier could 
be so described.  Zei ?refers not to the state of mind of the guards in killing the 
enemy soldiers, but to the fact that the killing of the soldiers in the particular 
circumstances of surrender was wrongful. 
A clause of the statutes on stables (jiu lü??) from the same period, or 
perhaps the first century A.D., provided: “When domestic animals zei sha??each 
other, one third of the value is to be paid as an indemnity to restore harmony (between 
                                                
38 Slip 49, p. 141. 
39 Slip 4, p. 134. 
40 Han shu, 10. 3395. 
41 A.F.P. Hulsewé, “Assault and Battery at the Palace Gates”, in P Daffinà (ed), Indo-sino-tibetica. 
Studi in onore di Luciano Petech. Studi Orientali IX (1990), p. 196; Remnants of Han Law, p. 254 
42 S.A. Queen, From chronicle to canon. The hermeneutics of the Spring and Autumn, according to 
Tung Chung-shu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 66; it is in any case mistaken to 
refer zei?in this clause to murder rather than wounding. 
43 See note 62 below. 
44 Slip discovered in Ma-quan-wan ??? (Tun-huang ??) in 1979, probably dating to the end of 
the first century B.C. (compare M. Loewe, “Han administrative documents. Recent finds from the 
North-West,” T’oung Pao LXXII (1986), p. 302).  For the text and comment see Gao Heng, 
“Investigation of Han Strips,” pp. 233-4. 
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the owners).”45  Hulsewé takes zei ?in the sense of ‘to hurt so as to kill’.46  But the 
suggestion of the editors of Rare Codes that the meaning is to be gathered from a 
comparison with article 206 of the Tang ?code47 is more plausible.  This article deals 
with dogs who ‘spontaneously’ kill or wound another person’s domestic animals.  The 
term used to describe the act of killing or wounding is zi sha shang???, where zi ?
points to the fact that the dog has acted spontaneously, of its own accord, without 
being instigated by its owner.  Zei? in the Han?clause appears to have a similar 
sense: the animal has acted spontaneously, of its own accord, without human 
provocation. 
An edict of emperor Cheng ?in 20 B.C. provides that, where a child aged 6 or 
under committed inter alia the offense of zei dou sha???, a petition was to be sent 
to the throne, so that there might be a reprieve from the death penalty.48  We have 
here a reference to the offenses of zei sha ??or dou sha??(killing in a fight) 
established by the zei lü??.  Hulsewé misunderstood the phrase zei dou sha ???
by taking it as ‘who had killed people in a murderous fight’49. Zei ?and dou? have 
to be taken as disjunctive expressions.  Shen Jia-ben ???glosses zei ?as hai ? (to 
inflict harm, to kill) and notes that in the Tang ?code (article 306) the shu-yi??
commentary explains gu sha??by reference to hai xin?? (intention to kill).  He 
concludes that the zei sha?? of Han?law is the same as the gu sha ??of Tang? 
law.50  This conclusion is not justified. The zei sha ??to which emperor Cheng ?
refers does not convey the same range of ideas as the gu sha ??of Tang ?law. 
While the latter clearly refers to the perpetrator’s state of mind, the former refers to 
the external circumstances of the act, in particular, the unprovoked use of violence. 
This is especially apparent in the present case, since it is somewhat artificial even to 
conceive of a child aged six or under forming an ‘intention to kill’. 
The zei lü ??of the second century A.D. contained a clause on zei ?cutting 
down  trees51. The interpretation of zei? in this context has given trouble.  Hulsewé 
takes it simply as ‘injuring’,52 Heuser as ‘felling’,53 while Shen Jia-ben ???
suggests ‘with intention (you xin??)’.54  It is doubtful whether Shen’s suggestion is 
correct.  Zei ?appears to refer more to the physical circumstances of the act than the 
state of mind of the feller of the trees.  It perhaps expresses the unlawful nature of the 
act of destruction. 
For more exact information on the meaning of zei ?we have to look at other 
material from the Han, namely, the terms of actual indictments and the details of 
judicial cases.  We have preserved an indictment in a case of zei sha ??from the 
latter half of the first century B.C.  It relates that when one guardsman met another 
                                                
45 Preserved in a bamboo slip discovered at Tun-huang??in 1907.  See Liu and Yang, Zhong guo 
zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji cheng, II, p. 108; Gao Heng, “Investigation of Bamboo Slips”, pp. 226-7. 
46 Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 257. 
47 W. Johnson, The T’ang Code. Volume II. Specific Articles. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1997., p. 192. 
48 Han shu, 4. 1106. 
49 Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, pp. 299, 344-5. 
50 Shen Jia-ben, Li dai xing fa kao, 3, p. 1466. 
51 Jin shu ??. Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1974, 3.924. 
52 Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 33. 
53 R. Heuser, Das Rechtskapitel im Jin-shu. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis des Rechts im frühen 
chinesischen Kaiserreich. München: J. Schweitzer, 1987, p. 90. 
54 Shen Jia-ben, Li dai xing fa kao, 3, pp. 1452-3. 
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(apparently an enemy) he grasped his sword and, upon seeing that the other held a 
wooden cudgel, followed him and struck him from behind, inflicting three wounds on 
the neck.  The victim died from these wounds within ten days and the attacker was 
charged with zei sha??.55  The editors of Rare Codes gloss zei ?as ‘intentional (gu 
yi??)’ and take zei sha ??as being the same as gu sha??in the Tang ?code.  
However, one should note that there is no reference to intention in the words of the 
indictment.  The conclusion that the guardsman has committed the offense of zei sha 
??is drawn from the facts of unprovoked violence, enumerated in the indictment, 
namely, that he followed his victim and struck him from behind with his sword. 
The histories contain a number of references to nobles held liable for the 
offense of zei sha?? . 56   However, few of the references describe the facts 
constituting the offense.  One notes that a member of the imperial family, indicted in 
56 B.C. for zei sha??, had killed slaves with a knife.57  There was clearly an act of 
violence which, given the status of the victims, could not be considered as occurring 
in a fight.  A passage added to Si-ma Qian’s ???Shi ji ??by Chu Shao-sun ??
?in the second half of the first century B.C. gives some details of the judicial 
investigation into an accusation brought by Zhao Guang-han in ???66 B.C. against 
the wife of his enemy, the chancellor Wei Xiang??.  It had been alleged that in 71 
B.C. she had zei sha ??one of her maids.  In fact the investigation found that the 
maid had not been killed with a weapon (bing ren??) but had committed suicide 
after a reprimand for an offense.58  This points to the same sense of zei sha?? as in 
the case of 56 B.C., that is, the killing of a slave by the master with a knife or the like. 
Zhao Guang-han???himself later in 66 B. C. was impeached both for the zei 
sha??of innocent persons and “deliberately investigating lawsuits not by means of 
the truth (gu bu yi shi ????).”59  It is the second offense which in fact explains the 
force of zei ?in this context.  Zhao? had not personally killed the innocent persons, 
but he had misused the judicial process in order to send them to the executioner.  He 
was thus in the same position as a person who had used an axe to strike and kill 
another.  The element of intention expressed by gu?does not form part of the 
meaning of zei?.  It constitutes an essential part of the external circumstances 
showing that the killing had to be treated as zei ?.  Should Zhao ?have inadvertently 
made an error and condemned an innocent person to death, the killing would not have 
been treated as zei?.  A similar case occurred in 55 B.C. when Zhang Chang??, the 
governor of the capital, was accused of the zei sha??of innocent persons and of 
“having been deliberately untruthful in the investigation of a lawsuit (gu bu zhi???
                                                
55 See a wooden document discovered at Ju-yan ??, Liu and Yang, Zhong guo zhen xi fa lü dian ji ji 
cheng, II, pp. 190-1. 
56 Shi ji ??, 10. 3077, Han shu, 7. 2141, Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 255 (3), and B. Watson, 
Records of the Grand Historian of China. Volume II. The Age of Emperor Wu 140 to circa 100 B.C. 
New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 362; Han shu, 3. 662, Hulsewé, pp. 255-6 
(5)); Han shu, 3. 664, Hulsewé, p. 256 (6); Han shu, 10. 3234, Hulsewé, p. 256 (7); Han shu, 2. 487, 
Hulsewé, p. 256 (8); Shih chi??, 8. 2687, Han shu,10. 3205, Hulsewé, p. 256 (9); Han shu, 2. 489-90, 
Hulsewé, p. 256 (10); Han shu, 2. 412, 8. 2421, Hulsewé, p. 256 (11); Han shu, 10. 3374, Hulsewé, p. 
256 (12); Han shu, 8. 2218, Hulsewé, p. 256 (13); Han shu, 10. 3425, Hulsewé, pp. 256-7 (15). 
57 Han shu, 8. 2421, Hulsewé, p. 256 (11). 
58 Shi ji ??, 8. 2687.  See also Han shu, 10. 3205, Hulsewé, p. 256 (9); C.M. Wilbur, Slavery in 
China During the Former Han Dynasty 206 B C. – A.D. 25. 1943, reprinted New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1967, pp. 373-5. 
59 Han shu, 10. 3205, Hulsewé, p. 258 (4). 
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).”60   The case in fact had been one in which the governor had had a minor official 
who had offended him arrested and tried at great speed so that the proceedings could 
be completed before the end of the winter (the season for executions).  The victim was 
then put to death.61 
The most instructive judicial account of zei?occurs not in a case of zei sha?
?but in one of zei shang??.62  The facts were that Xue Kuang辥? employed Yang 
Ming ??to wound and disfigure his enemy Shen Xian??, so incapacitating the 
latter from taking up a position at court.  Yang ?intercepted Shen? outside the 
palace gates, cut off his nose and lips, and inflicted eight further wounds on his body.  
The authorities who first investigated the case reported to the throne that this act of 
mutilation was “fierce and vile, without any awe or restraint (jie jie wu suo wei ji??
????).”63 and could not be considered the same as wounds inflicted in the course 
of a fight by angry persons.  The offense amounted to ‘great irreverence (da bu jing?
??)’, that is, was a monstrous act of disrespect to the emperor, for which the 
punishment was beheading.  
The commandant of justice disagreed with this conclusion.  He pointed out 
that the root of the matter was a private quarrel between Xue 辥and Shen?.  Although 
the incident took place outside the gates of the imperial palace, the wounds were 
inflicted in the road.  From this perspective, the case was no different from that of 
ordinary persons engaged in a quarrel and fight.  The point of this argument was to 
show that the offense should not be treated as da bu jing???.  The commandant of 
justice did not mean that the wounds themselves should be treated as though they had 
been inflicted in the course of a fight.  He concluded on the facts (the unprovoked act 
of violence) that the offense was one of zei shang ??for which the punishment was 
penal servitude.  Since there was a dispute between the authorities as to the proper 
disposal of the case, the emperor asked his ministers for their advice.  Most approved 
the view of the commandant of justice.  
The point of special interest is the finding by the investigating authorities that 
the wounds had been inflicted “without awe and restraint (wu suo wei ji????).”  
This is a similar expression to that which we have already met in the case decided by 
Shu-xiang??in 528 B.C.64  The commandant of justice did not disagree with this 
particular finding of fact.  It was the total lack of restraint manifested in the attack on 
an unsuspecting victim that showed the offense to be zei shang ??and not dou shang
??. 
There is one further case to consider.  This involved xi sha ??(killing in a 
game) not zei sha??.  It is a decision of Bao Yu??, a judge who flourished around 
A.D. 75, recorded by Ying Shao?? (latter half of the second century A.D.) in his 
Feng-su tong???.  On the occasion that Du Shi ??took a wife, there was mutual 
play (xi?). One of the guests, Zhang Shen??, tied up Du Shi ??and gave him 
twenty punches, then further suspended him by his feet.  There are two versions of the 
                                                
60 Han shu, 10. 3225, Hulsewé, p. 258 (6). 
61 Han shu, 10. 3223. 
62 Han shu, 10. 3395. See, in particular, Hulsewé, “Assault and Battery at the Palace Gate,” pp. 191-
200. 
63 Hulsewé, “Assault and Battery at the Palace Gate”, p. 195. 
64 See note 19 above. 
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decision given by Bao Yu??.  In one,65 he is said to have held that Zhang Shen’s ?
?mind (xin?) from the beginning lacked the intention (yi?) of zei hai?? 
(inflicting harm zei?).  Hulsewé translates the relevant part of the decision as “When 
after wine people frolic together, we have to consider their original ideas (lit. ‘hearts’, 
xin?); they are without the intention of zei hai, destructive harm??.”66  Here zei ?
appears still to express the element of violence in the act of killing.  Bao Yu’s ??
point is that, although there was the appearance of violence, proper consideration of 
the facts showed that there had been no intention to cause death or injury.  The phrase 
zei hai ??refers to the external circumstances of an act (violence resulting in harm), 
not to the offender’s state of mind.  
Another version of the case preserved in the Tai ping yu-lan ????employs 
a different form of words.67  This states that from the beginning, the perpetrator’s 
mind or intention (yi?) lacked zei hsin??.  Wallacker translates: “If one probes to 
the basic idea (of the play), there is no malicious heart (zei hsin??).”68  However, it 
is by no means obvious that zei? has to be taken in the sense of ‘malicious’, that is, 
as a reference to the perpetrator’s state of mind.69  Zei xin?? may simply carry the 
implication of a heart intent upon doing violence, where zei ?expresses the physical 
fact of violence and not the mental element of intention. 
The survey of statutory and judicial data from the Han permits the conclusion 
that in Han?law zei sha??and zei shang??were technical terms for a certain 
category of homicide or wounding.  This category was characterised by the infliction 
of injury through the use of force but can be distinguished from the category of killing 
or wounding in the course of a fight where force also was used.  When the act 
occurred zei?, the violence was unprovoked, but rather inflicted in a sudden assault 
which took the victim by surprise.  There are cases of what may be termed ‘judicial 
murder’ in which an official who has abused the judicial process in order to secure the 
conviction and execution of an enemy is also held guilty of zei sha??.  Here, 
although the violence by which the victim met his end was apparently legitimate (an 
act performed by the executioner in the course of his duties), the circumstances of the 
condemnation showed that it was illegitimate and so zei?, responsibility of course 
resting with the official who had procured the condemnation and not with the 
executioner.  In such cases it is the unlawful nature of the act of killing expressed in 
the abuse of the judicial process, rather than the element of violence (also present), 
which underlies the meaning of zei?.  Of course, the abuse of the judicial process 
itself derives from an intention to do wrong, a fact expressed in the description of the 
offense as gu bu yi shi????.  But the fact that the homicide activated by the abuse 
is still described in terms of zei? points here to the ‘situation’ (the outrageous 
disregard of duty on the part of the sentencing official) from which the killing results. 
 
                                                
65 Ying Shao ??. Le Fong Sou T’ong Yi????. Pékin: Centre franco-chinois d’études sinologiques, 
1943, p. 107. 
66 Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, p. 253. 
67 Tai-ping yu-lan ????. Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1985, 846.10a, p. 3783. 
68 Wallacker, “The Chinese Offense of Homicide Through Horseplay,” pp. 268-9. 
69 Compare, however, the explanation of zei xin??given in the Grand dictionnaire Ricci de la langue 
chinois. Paris-Taipei: Instituts Ricci and Desclée de Brouwer, 2001, VI, p. 68 (No. 11342) as “coeur 
mauvais, perfide, hypocrite, sans scruple.” 
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Zei Sha??in the Law of the Jin ? (A.D. 265-419) and Southern Dynasties ??(A.D. 
420-588) 
Although we have some details of the Jin laws on zei sha, we do not have any 
information on the position in the southern dynasties.  Since these dynasties inherited 
the Jin?code to which they appear to have made few substantive changes, the 
likelihood is that they also retained the categories of zei sha??and zei shang??. 
The zei lü?? of the Jin ?code still utilised the category of zei sha??.  Our 
main information comes from the definitions which the jurist Zhang Fei?? 
elaborated in his preface to the code, but we also have recorded in the Jin shu ??a 
case of homicide denominated as zei sha??.  The text70 describes the assassination 
of a high official in A.D. 291 as a case of zei sha ??but notes that the circumstances 
of the killing did not disclose a mou ?or plot to kill.  Cheng Shu-de ??徳 has 
drawn from this observation the illegitimate inference that the Jin ? code 
distinguished between gu sha??and mou sha??.71  The correct inference is that 
the code distinguished between zei sha??and mou sha??.  There is no indication 
that zei sha ??is to be understood in a sense other than that it bore in the Han?zei 
lü??. 
Zhang Fei ??defines both the terms zei ?and gu?.  The latter is defined as 
“As to those (criminal acts in which the perpetrator) knowingly commits it, we call it 
‘intent’.”72  This definition is referable primarily to the range of administrative 
offenses which might be committed intentionally or by error.  One standard example, 
as under the Han?, is that of ‘deliberately conducting a judicial investigation not in 
accordance with the truth (gu bu zhi???)’. That gu ?in Jin ?law was not referable 
to homicide is shown by the fact that the definition of zei ?is given in a context 
which examines the various categories of killing. Zhang Fei ??defines in turn the 
technical terms dou?, xi?, zei?, and guo shi??.  Zei is taken to be “without any 
particular ground to hack and strike.”73  Wallacker translates “In the absence of 
(justifying) change (in circumstances) to hack and strike, we call it ‘malice’.”74  
However, there does not seem any justification for reading into zei? the element of a 
state of mind.  The definition itself suggests that zei ?has to be understood as a 
physical state characterised by unprovoked violence.  Hence, the renderings of Heuser 
(Gewalttätigkeit)75 and Heyde (Gewalttät)76 are to be preferred.  One of the reasons 
for Wallacker’s understanding of zei? as ‘malice’ is the fact that the definition which 
immediately follows glosses guo shi ?? (‘accident’) as “not thinking (bu yi??) by 
mistake to violate (the law).”77  Here there is a specific reference to the state of mind 
characterised by a failure to advert to the consequences of one’s action.  Wallacker 
supposes that the previous definition (zei?) balances the definition of guo shi??by 
                                                
70 Jin shu, 4. 1060. 
71 Cheng Shu-de??徳, Jiu-chao lü-kao???? (A Study of the Legal Systems of the Han-Sui 
Dynasties , 1926, reprinted Beijing; Zhong-hua, 1988, pp. 242-3. 
72 Jin shu, 4. 928; B.E. Wallacker, “Chang Fei’s Preface to the Chin Code of Law,” T’oung Pao LXXII 
(1986), p. 236. 
73 Jin shu, 4. 928. 
74 “Chang Fei’s Preface ….”, p. 238 (8). 
75 Heuser, Rechtskapitel im Jin-shu, p. 112. 
76 D. Heyde, “Der von Zhang Fei verfasste Kommentar zum Gesetzeswerke der Jin”, Altorientalische 
Forschungen 11 (1984), p. 362. 
77 “Chang Fei’s Preface….”, p. 238 (9). 
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referring to the presence of an intention to do evil.  However, one should not read too 
much into the juxtaposition of the terms zei ?and guo shi??.  It must be seen as 
significant that Zhang Fei’s ??definition of zei ?concentrates on the physical 
aspect of violence and makes no reference to intention. 
Further definitions offered by Zhang Fei ?? supply some interesting 
examples of situations deemed by the law to fall within the ambit of zei sha??.  
Two situations are said to resemble (and so to be treated as) zei?, even though they 
might at first sight look like ‘accidents (guo shi??)’.  These are: to gallop a horse in 
a crowded place in a city, or to shoot an arrow in the direction of a house or crowd of 
people, with the result in either case that someone is killed.78  Equally what looks like 
a case of killing in a fight ought to be treated as zei sha??, as where a person of high 
rank fights with a person of low rank and either killed the other.79  Finally, we have a 
situation in which the killing might be treated as xi ?or zei? according to the 
emotional state of the parties: should a happy child kill an angry child it is xi?, where 
the element of ‘game’ is emphasised, but should an angry child kill a happy child, it is 
zei?, where the element of unprovoked violence is emphasised.80  The general point 
Zhang Fei ??is making with these examples is that it is essential to look at all the 
circumstances of the case before arriving at the correct category of homicide.  Proper 
evaluation of the circumstances of a case may show that it should be treated as falling 
within the serious category of zei sha??, even though at first sight it appears to fall 
within a different category.  This process of classification is not one of deciding 
whether there is or is not an intention to kill, or whether such an intention should be 
imputed to the perpetrator, but of whether different situations contain elements which 
justify their treatment in the same way as the standard case of zei sha??, that of 
unprovoked violence. 
 
Gu Sha??in the Law of the Northern Dynasties?? (A.D. 386-589) 
We have seen that in the law of the Han?, Jin?, and southern dynasties cases of 
homicide were treated as falling under zei sha??not according to the criterion of 
whether an intention to kill could be shown or not, but according to the external 
circumstances of the act, in particular the degree of violence and the possibility of 
resistance on the part of the victim.  This is not the approach which we see in the 
formulation of the Northern Wei ?? (A.D. 386-534) rules on homicide.  We do not 
have preserved the rules governing the different categories of homicide, but we do 
have the rules governing the killing of a child by a parent as stated in the code in force 
in the first quarter of the sixth century.  The statutes on fighting (dou lü??) 
contained the following provisions: “Where a paternal grandparent or parent becomes 
angry and kills a grandchild or child with a weapon (bing ren??), the punishment is 
to be penal servitude for five years; should the victim die from a beating (for example, 
with a stick), the punishment is to be penal servitude for four years.  But if there has 
                                                
78 Jin shu, 4. 929; Wallacker, “Chang Fei’s Preface….”, p. 243; Heuser, Rechtskapitel im Jin-shu,  pp. 
114-5; Heyde, “Der von Zhang Fei verfasste Kommentar….”, p. 363. 
79 Jin shu, 4. 928; Wallacker, “Chang Fei’s Preface….,” p. 243 (though compare the different 
interpretation in “The Chinese Offense of Homicide Through Horseplay,” p. 271; Heuser, 
Rechtskapitel im Jin-shu, p. 114; Heyde, “Der von Zhang Fei verfasste Kommentar….”, p. 363. 
80 Jin shu, 4. 930; Wallacker, “Chang Fei’s Preface….,” p. 258; Heuser, Rechtskapitel im Jin-shu, p. 
120; Heyde, “Der von Zhang Fei verfasste Kommentar….”, p. 367. 
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been hatred and an intention to kill (gu sha??), the punishment in each case is to be 
increased by one degree.”81 
Several points are suggested by this clause.  First, it deals with a special case 
and does not state the general rules on the categories of homicide.  Second, the focus 
is still upon the particular incidents characterising the killing, the relationship between 
perpetrator and victim, the nature of the implement used (weapon or stick), and 
whether there had been provocation or not (suggested by the ‘anger’ of the 
grandparent or parent).  Third, among the relevant circumstances are the state of mind 
of the parent or grandparent.  This is evident not so much from the reference to anger, 
which explains the resort to chastisement, but from that to ‘hatred (ai zeng??) 
present in the heart (xin?)’.  It is the presence of this emotion that takes the offense 
to a different level of seriousness.  Fourth, the most significant point, the legislators 
are not content with a reference to ‘hatred in the heart’ as the explanation for the 
increase in punishment.  They interpolate an additional reference to the perpetrator’s 
state of mind with respect to the act in question, that is, the intention to kill (gu sha?
?).  This is the first time we find the abstract concept of intention used in the 
formulation of the statutory rules on homicide as a determinant of punishment. 
Despite the use of the term gu sha?? in the clause on parents and 
grandparents killing their children or grandchildren, we cannot be entirely sure that 
the Northern Wei ??code had substituted gu sha ??for zei sha??as a category of 
homicide.  The code still contained a section entitled zei lü??, but we have 
preserved from it only details of the rules on mou sha?? (plotting to kill).82  In some 
contexts a term other than gu sha??, expressing an intention to kill, might be used.  
The code provided that there should be no liability where an offender died 
‘unexpectedly (xie hou??)’ in the course of a beating administered on the orders of 
an investigating official.  In a case which arose shortly after 516 a military official had 
caused a subordinate to be beaten to death on the ground of a minor offense.  The 
official, even though the offender had confessed, still ordered the beating to continue, 
shouting ‘strike and kill’.  A high official asked to advise the empress dowager on the 
case said that the circumstances showed that there had been ‘an intention to kill (sha 
xin??)’.  This took the homicide out of the class of ‘unexpectedly dying’ and 
justified a sentence of death.83   Although this account shows that the authorities in 
homicide cases might construct their reasoning in terms of the presence or absence of 
an intention to kill, it does not assist us in determining whether the code had a general 
category of gu sha??. 
We know that other rules of the Northern Wei ??code concerned with 
serious offenses were formulated in terms of gu?.  In a case of 514 concerned with 
the sale of a free person there is cited a clause stating: “Where one knows a person 
has seized and stolen property, but deliberately (gu?) buys, sentence as accessory (to 
the thief).”84  On the basis of this slender evidence we might infer that the Northern 
Wei??legislators had a preference for describing with the term gu?states of mind 
in which the offender knew he was doing wrong or intended to do wrong.  They may 
                                                
81 Wei shu. Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1974, 8. 2886; Cheng, Jiu-chao lü-kao, pp. 357-8; T’ung-tsu Ch’ü. 
Law and Society in Traditional China. 1961, reprinted Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1980, 
pp. 23, 41. 
82 Wei shu, 8. 2882; Cheng, Jiu-chao lü-kao, p. 353. 
83 Wei shu, 6. 2005; Cheng, Jiu-chao lü-kao, p. 360. 
84 Wei shu, 8. 2881; Cheng, Jiu-chao lü-kao, p. 353. 
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further have wished to emphasise the element of intention in homicide and so 
replaced the term zei sha??with gu sha??. 
Some confirmation of the suggestion that the Northern Wei ??code had a 
category of gu sha??is supplied by the rules of the Sui ? (A.D. 581-618) code of 
581. This code was influenced by the code of the Northern Qi ?? (A.D. 550-577), 
which was derived from the Northern Wei ??code.  We know that the Sui?code 
had a category of homicide denominated gu sha??, since a clause provided that 
officials who committed inter alia the offense of gu sha ?? should still be 
disenrolled, even though an amnesty had reprieved them from death85. 
 
Gu Sha ??in Tang ? (A.D. 618-907) and Later Law 
The direct model for the Tang ?code of A.D. 624 was the Sui?code of 581.  It is 
probable that the Tang ?took its provisions on gu sha ??from the Sui?.  Article 
306 states that, where a person is killed in the course of a fight, the killer is to be 
sentenced to strangulation.  But should a knife (jen?) have been used, or should there 
have been a case of gu sha??, the punishment is to be beheading.  Further, should a 
weapon (bing jen??) have been used in a fight, resulting in the death of a 
participant, the killer is to be sentenced for gu sha??.  The last part of the article, as 
well as mentioning ‘deliberate wounding’ (gu shang ??), for which the punishment 
is one degree more severe than wounding in a fight,86 puts the case in which there has 
been a fight, the participants have broken off, and after a short interval have met again 
with the result that one kills the other.  This is to be treated as gu sha??and not as 
killing in a fight.87 
The article itself thus firmly locates gu sha??in the context of a fight in 
which a weapon has been used. Nothing is said about gu sha??as ‘intentional 
killing’.  The shu-yi ??commentary, added in 653, first introduces a reference to a 
state of mind, although it is interesting to note that this occurs in the explanation of 
dou sha??and not gu sha??. The commentary defines cases of ‘fighting and 
beating (dou ou??)’ as those in which “from the beginning there had been no 
intention to kill (yuan wu sha xin????),” but someone had been killed in the 
course of a fight.  It next explains the phrase of the article stating “by means of a knife 
or gu sha??” as “where one fights and uses a knife, one then has an intention to 
cause harm (hai xin??), or where, not on account of a fight and quarrel, lacking any 
preceding incident (shi?), one kills, this is gu sha??.”  Some one hundred and fifty 
years later, in 822, the poet and jurist Bo Ju-yi ???in a famous opinion determined 
that the phrase “lacking any preceding incident” meant the same as “not in the course 
of a fight.”88 
The commentary in its specific explanation of gu sha??still adverts to the 
occurrence of a fight as the decisive factor.  Gu sha??is committed where someone 
                                                
85 Sui shu ??. Beijing: Zhong-hua, 1973, 3. 711; É Balazs. Le traité juridique du “Souei-Chou”. 
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954, p. 75 
86 This still follows the substance of the old Han rule. See note 41 above. 
87 Johnson, T’ang Code, II, pp. 331-2. 
88 On Bo’s opinion see B.E. Wallacker, “The Poet as Jurist: Po Chü-i and a Case of Conjugal 
Homicide,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 41 (1981), pp. 507-26; G. MacCormack, “The 
Traditional Chinese Law of Homicide, Po Chü-i and the Eiusdem Generis Principle,” Chinese Culture 
XXXV. 3 (1994), pp. 7-14. 
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is killed not in the course of a fight, that is, where there has been some overwhelming 
act of violence or surreptitious attack, precluding any possibility of resistance.   It is 
only from the definition in the commentary of ‘fight and beat’ that one is able to infer 
that, conversely, gu sha??is characterised by the presence of an intention to kill. 
Such an intention will be inferred from the situation.   For example, the use by one 
participant in a fight of a knife will give rise to the inference that he intended real 
harm.  This is held to be tantamount to an intention to kill.  Equally, such an intention 
might be inferred where one participant in a fight, after the fight had broken up, 
returned and killed his opponent. 
One other reference to gu sha??in the context of mou sha?? (plotting to 
kill) is also instructive.  ‘Plotting’ is defined in the code as involving “two or more 
persons,” but it is also said: “if the circumstances of the plot are clear and evident then 
one person may be considered to be the same as two persons.”  The latter case is 
explained in the commentary with the following example: “If someone enters another 
person’s house carrying a knife or a club, and investigation proves them to be enemies 
who each desires to kill the other, then even though there be only one person, this 
situation is considered the same as a plot.”89  Although mou sha ??covers the case 
in which the intention to kill has been premeditated, we note again that the approach 
of the Tang ? legislators is still based on actual situations from which such an 
intention might be inferred (the coming together of two or more persons to make a 
plan, or the illicit entry of an armed intruder into his enemy’s house).  
In Tang law mou sha ??as a category of homicide applied only to the case in 
which the plot to kill had been unsuccessful.  Should it have been fulfilled and the 
death of the victim accomplished, we are told in the shu-yi ??commentary that the 
homicide is one of gu sha??.90  This shows not just that the Tang legislators made 
no clear distinction between a premeditated intention to kill and one formed at the 
time of the act itself, but that gu sha?? in the context of a ‘plot to kill’ was still 
explained in terms of particular situations from which an intention to kill was 
inferable. 
We recall that in the Jin ?code two extended cases of zei sha??were 
homicide resulting from the galloping of a horse in a city or the shooting of arrows in 
the direction of people.  These examples passed into the Sui ?code and from there 
into the Tang ?code.  In the course of their transmission important changes in the 
rules occurred.  The classification of zei sha??, now termed gu sha??, was 
retained only in one case: the shooting of arrows in the direction of the imperial 
palace.91  Where arrows were shot in the direction of a city wall, road, or a person’s 
                                                
89 Article 55; W. Johnson, The T’ang Code Volume I, General Principles (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 268. 
90 Article 18; Johnson, T’ang Code, I, p. 119. I would like to thank the editor, Professor W. Johnson, 
for suggesting, rightly, that caution is necessary in the interpretation of the words of the commentary to 
article 18: “where a plot to kill (mou sha??) a person has resulted in the death of the victim, (this is) 
also the same as (gu sha??).” Article 18 specifies the offenses for which an official is still to be 
disenrolled despite an amnesty. In this context the expression “also the same” may simply mean that 
both mou sha?? (where the victim has been killed) and gu sha ??are offenses falling within the 
scope of the article, the point being that an unsuccessful plot to kill is not included. This is undoubtedly 
one point made by the commentary. However, the somewhat elliptic phraseology also seems to imply 
that a successful mou sha??, at least where one person alone had planned the killing, was not to be 
distinguished from gu sha??. 
91 Article 73; Johnson, T’ang Code, II, p. 36. 
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house, and someone was killed, the case was to be treated as dou sha?? (killing in a 
fight) with a reduction in punishment of one degree, that is, exile instead of 
strangulation.92  Where a horse was galloped though a city or crowd of people and 
someone was killed, the case was also to be treated as dou sha ??with a reduction in 
punishment of one degree93. 
The Tang ?evidence suggests that with the substitution of gu sha??for zei 
sha??the emphasis for the legislators came to be placed rather more upon the 
mental state of intention than the physical act of violence.  Gu sha ??as a category 
of homicide was seen as an act accompanied by an intention to kill.  However, we 
should note two points about the treatment of gu sha?? in the Tang ?code: the 
definition of the term was still not divorced altogether from the ‘situation’ which gave 
rise to it, and the ‘intention’ characterising gu sha ?? (intentional killing) was not 
clearly distinguished from that characterising mou sha ?? (plotting to kill). 
The Ming ?legislators first appear to have made clearer the difference 
between gu sha ??as a concept focused upon a mental state and the actual situation 
from which it sprang, to have made a more explicit definition of gu sha ??in terms 
of intention to kill, and to have distinguished the intention to kill constituting the 
offense of gu sha ??from that constituting the offense of mou sha??. 
The article in the code of the Ming ?dynasty (A.D. 1368-1644), which 
introduces gu sha??,94 is headed ‘fight and beat as well as gu sha?? a person’.  
This shows that the earlier connection in the minds of the legislators between killing 
in a fight and intentional killing has been retained.  The article is divided into three 
parts.  The first deals with killing in a fight (punished with strangulation), the second 
with intentional killing or gu sha ?? (punished with beheading), and the third with 
plotting to beat a person and causing death (where the person inflicting the wound 
causing death is to be punished with strangulation, the person who formed the idea of 
the attack with 100 blows and exile to 3000 li?,95 and the others involved with 100 
blows with the heavy stick).  In explaining this provision, commentators from the late 
Ming ?and early Qing? (A.D. 1644-1911) concentrate upon the state of mind of the 
offender.  They analyse the difference between the state of mind characterising mou 
sha?? from that characterising gu sha??.  Although they also refer to a number of 
particular situations, their focus is upon the evidence which allows one to infer that 
the perpetrator had the intention to kill.  The law has decisively shifted its emphasis 
from a concern with the physical circumstances of an act of homicide to the 
identification of the perpetrator’s state of mind. 
Three commentaries may be cited to show the importance attached to the 
mental element in homicide (what the modern law terms mens rea) by the law of the 
late Ming?.  The earliest is the Du lü suo yan ????(Miscellaneous Notes on 
Reading the Code), compiled by Lei Meng-lin ???in 1565.96  Lei has pertinent 
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comments upon both the article dealing with mou sha??and that dealing with gu sha
??and dou sha??.  He defines the phrase ‘mou sha ren ?? (plot to kill a person)’ 
in the former article97 as referring primarily to “two or more persons,” but then adds 
the point already made in the small commentary to article 55 of the Tang? code,98 to 
the effect that, where the circumstances of the plot are manifest, one person may be 
considered the same as two persons.  Lei then sums up his explanation of mou? in 
the words: “Therefore, where in general one has an enemy whom one hates and 
wishes to kill, whether the plot is formed in the mind of the individual or arranged 
with others, there is first the forming of a plan and then the act of killing.”99  The 
essential point is that the intention necessary for mou sha?? must be premeditated, 
that is, formed prior to the act of killing. It is evidenced though a plan to kill made 
either with others or formed only in the mind of the perpetrator. 
In his commentary on the article dealing with dou sha??and gu sha??, Lei 
is concerned to differentiate the two offenses through the presence or absence of an 
intention to kill. Cases of dou sha??are defined as those in which persons become 
angry, quarrel, and fight, with the result that one of the participants is killed.  The fact 
that there has been no intention (xin?) to kill justifies the imposition of the 
punishment of strangulation rather than beheading. Lei then repeats the point that the 
killing is to be treated as dou sha?? only should there be lacking the idea (yi?) of 
killing a person. Should one of the parties to what appears to be a fight intentionally 
(ku yi??) inflict a savage beating and kill the other, there is demonstrated an ‘evil 
intention (e hsin??), a wish to bring about death, and the case has to be treated as gu 
sha??.  Lei does not state explicitly that such an ‘evil intention’ must be formed at 
the time of the fight or beating.  Indeed, later in his commentary he remarks that the 
characteristic of gu sha?? is that “the intention (yi?) to kill moves from the heart 
(xin?) and is not something that can be known to or followed by others.  If the 
intention to kill (yi gu??) is first communicated to others, who are to implement it, 
one has mou sha??and not gu sha??.100  Although these words suggest that the 
intention marking gu sha??  is to be defined by reference to absence of 
communication and not the time of formation, one may still perhaps infer that Lei, in 
distinguishing gu sha ??from dou sha??, had in mind the fact that the intention to 
kill was formed at the time of or during the fight. 
The second commentary is the Zuan zhu ??(Incorporated Commentary) 
appended by Gao Ju??to his edition of the Ming code published in 1610, Ming lü ji 
jie fu li101. This largely follows the approach of the Du lü suo yan, distinguishing gu 
sha??from mou sha ??according to whether the intention was communicated to 
others or not, and dou sha??from gu sha ??according to whether one of the 
participants in the fight had formed the intention (xin?) to kill. The point is also 
made that mou?means ‘forming a plan, deciding on a stratagem for killing’, whereas 
gu means simply ‘having the intention to kill (at the time of the act)’102. 
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The third commentary, the Du lü pei xi ???觹 (Bodkin [for unpicking knots] 
to be worn on the girdle, when reading the code), written by the early Qing scholar, 
Wang Ming-de ??徳, was published in 1674.103  It presents a more subtle analysis 
of the states of mind relevant to mou?, gu?and dou sha??than that of the earlier 
commentaries.  First, let us take the distinction between mou sha?? and gu sha??. 
Here the fundamental point is not that the intention to kill has not been communicated 
to others, since this may characterise mou sha ??as well as gu sha??, but whether 
the intention to kill has been habitually stored in the mind or not. Both mou sha ??
and gu sha?? imply the killing of a person who may be designated an enemy.  But 
in one case (mou sha??) the enmity is ever present in the mind, in the other (ku sha
??) it is not. Thus, suppose a person has cherished hatred against his enemy, 
happens by chance to meet him, and then kills him.  Although there has been no plot 
or stratagem for the killing, this is still mou sha ??because there has been a 
continual intention to kill.  The killer has merely taken advantage of a favorable 
opportunity to implement that intention.  But suppose an original enmity had been 
forgotten.  The two former enemies might meet, quarrel, and fight.  The previous 
hatred might revive and one might kill the other in circumstances which show that 
there had been an intention to kill (as where he continued to beat after the other had 
submitted or the onlookers had urged them to separate).  What is implied by this 
section of the commentary is an inference of an intention to kill not present at the time 
of the meeting but formed during the fight.  The intention is inferred both from the 
previous enmity and the circumstances of the fight.  Here for the first time it is made 
absolutely clear that the intention characterising gu sha??must be formed at the 
time of the act resulting in death. 
The commentary next considers the significance of the placing of the section 
on gu sha?? between the section on dou sha?? (killing in a fight) and that on tong 
mou gong ou ????  (together plot and collectively fight). Wang Ming-de’s 
argument appears to be that gu sha ??was inserted between these two offenses 
because its nature has something in common with both situations, that is, a quarrel 
and fight as well as a plot to beat someone might give rise to a homicide that has to be 
classified as gu sha??.  This is the case where two parties are quarrelling and 
fighting but one persists in beating the other even after he has submitted or been 
wounded and falls to the ground.  Further, in the case where several persons have 
combined to beat another, it is possible that they might be roused to kill because the 
victim refuses to yield and taunts or insults his attackers. Should they become 
inflamed and shout ‘kill him’, it is clear that an intention to kill has been formed. In 
all cases, Wang Ming-de adds, it is necessary that the victim die at the time of the 
fight or attack in the very spot at which it takes place104.  
Using the terminology of the common law, we can say that by the late Ming 
and early Qing? the law (legislation and opinions of legal experts) had come to pay 
as much attention to the mens rea as the actus reus in the offense of homicide.  So far 
as we can tell from the formulation of the rules, the law of the Han?and southern 
dynasties emphasised the actus reus (the actual circumstances of the deed) and paid 
                                                
103 Langlois, “Ming Law,” p. 213. 
104 The commentary is cited by XueYun-sheng ??? in his Tang Ming lü ho pian ????? (The  
Tang and Ming Codes Compared), 18. 18b-19a.  Compare also G. MacCormack, Traditional Chinese 
Penal Law. Edinburgh; Edinburgh University Press, 1990, p. 191.  For further discussion of gu sha?? 
in Qing law see Meijer, “Concept of  Ku-sha in the Ch’ing Code.” 
 22 
little explicit attention to the mens rea, the mental state of the perpetrator.  That the 
position began to change significantly in the law of the Northern Wei ??is 
suggested by the substitution of gu?for zei ?in the formulation of the rules defining 
the categories of homicide. But it is not until the Tang? that we have clear evidence 
of an approach to homicide that paid explicit attention to the perpetrator’s mental state 
as well as to the physical aspects of the offense.  Even so, the treatment of mens rea is 
muted. The shu-yi ??commentary says relatively little of the differing states of mind 
characterising mou sha??and gu sha??or of the circumstances from which an 
intention to kill might be inferred.  Not until the late Ming? and early Qing ?do 
jurists appear to have given adequate attention to the analysis of the mens rea 
necessary for the two most serious categories of homicide (mou sha ??and gu sha?
?).105 
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